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Routing for Traffic Networks with Mixed Autonomy
Daniel A. Lazar1, Samuel Coogan2, and Ramtin Pedarsani3
Abstract—In this work we propose a macroscopic model for
studying routing on networks shared between human-driven and
autonomous vehicles that captures the effects of autonomous
vehicles forming platoons. We use this to study inefficiency
due to selfish routing and bound the Price of Anarchy (PoA),
the maximum ratio between total delay experienced by selfish
users and the minimum possible total delay. To do so, we
establish two road capacity models, each corresponding to an
assumption regarding the platooning capabilities of autonomous
vehicles. Using these we develop a class of road delay functions,
parameterized by the road capacity, that are polynomial with
respect to vehicle flow. We then bound the PoA and the bicriteria,
another measure of the inefficiency due to selfish routing. We find
these bounds depend on: 1) the degree of the polynomial in the
road cost function and 2) the degree of asymmetry, the difference
in how human-driven and autonomous traffic affect congestion.
We demonstrate that these bounds recover the classical bounds
when no asymmetry exists. We show the bounds are tight in
certain cases and that the PoA bound is order-optimal with
respect to the degree of asymmetry.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, automobiles are increasingly equipped
with autonomous and semi-autonomous technology, which
has potential to dramatically decrease traffic congestion [1].
Specifically, autonomous technologies enable platooning, in
which these vehicles automatically maintain short headways
between them via adaptive cruise control (ACC) or cooperative
adaptive cruise control (CACC). ACC uses sensing such
as radar or LIDAR to maintain a specific distance to the
preceeding vehicle with faster-than-human reaction time, and
CACC augments this with vehicle-to-vehicle communications.
When all vehicles are autonomous, the use of platooning
has the potential to increase network capacity as much as
three-fold [2], smooth traffic flow by eliminating shockwaves
of slowing vehicles [3], and enable synchronous acceleration
at green lights [4]. However, the presence of human-driven
vehicles – leading to mixed autonomy – makes much of these
benefits unclear.
Moreover, even in the absence of autonomous capabilities,
it is well known that if drivers route selfishly and minimize
their individual traffic delays, this does not in general min-
imize overall traffic delay. Understanding the extent of this
phenomenon can help city planners – if selfish routing does
not adversely affect congestion too much, then it may not be
necessary to try to control vehicle flow using schemes such
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Fig. 1: A social planner can decrease overall travel times by make routing
decisions that utilize autonomous vehicles’ ability to platoon, and choosing
different routes for human-driven vehicles (red) and autonomous vehicles
(blue). When vehicles route selfishly (a), vehicles pack onto a congested road.
In optimal routing (b), only autonomous vehicles are sent onto the road most
amenable to platooning.
as tolling. Alternatively, if selfishness can lead to much worse
congestion, then a city planner may wish to try to control
human routing decisions. See Figure 1 for an example of
selfish routing and optimal routing in mixed autonomy.
The ratio between traffic delay under worst-case selfish
routing and optimal routing is called the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) and is well understood for networks with only human-
driven vehicles [5]–[10]. Many such works also bound the bi-
criteria, which quantifies, for any given volume of vehicle flow
demand, how much additional flow can be routed optimally
to result in the same overall latency as the original volume of
traffic routed selfishly. Other studies have bounded the PoA
with multiple modes of transportation [11], [12]. However,
these prior works require assumptions that do not capture the
effects of congestion on roads shared between human-driven
and autonomous vehicles, leaving open the question of the
price of anarchy in mixed autonomy. In fact, we show that
these previous results do not hold, and the PoA for roads with
mixed autonomy can in general be unbounded!
Motivated by this observation, in this paper we provide
novel bounds on the PoA and bicriteria that depend on the
degree to which platooning decreases congestion, as well as
the degree of the polynomial describing road delay. To do so,
we use two models that describe road capacity as a function
of the fraction of vehicles on the road that are autonomous;
each model corresponds to a different assumption regarding
the technology that enables platooning. We use these capacity
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c1(x, y) = 1
c2(x, y) = ζx
Fig. 2: Road network with price of anarchy and bicriteria that grow unbound-
edly with ζ when considering 1/ζ units of human-driven flow and 1 unit
of autonomous flow demand, with ζ ≥ 1. Function arguments x and y
respectively denote human-driven and autonomous flow on a road.
models with a known polynomial road delay function, and, for
this class of latency functions, we bound the price of anarchy
and bicriteria. We develop two mechanisms for bounding
the PoA, which yield bounds that are tighter depending on
platoon spacing and polynomial degree. In our development
we provide the main elements of our proofs and defer proofs
of lemmas to the appendix.
In our formulation, the benefit due to the presence of
autonomous vehicles is limited to platoon formation, and the
probability that each vehicle is autonomous is independent
of the surrounding vehicles. While we acknowledge that
autonomous vehicles yield other benefits such as smoothing
traffic shockwaves, we consider platooning because it is a
mature technology that is commercially available. Further, if
autonomous vehicles actively rearrange themselves to form
platoons, the resulting capacity falls between the two capacity
models presented here [13].
Motivating Example. To show that bounds for the price of
anarchy previously developed for roads with only one type of
vehicle (i.e. no autonomous vehicles) do not hold, we present
an example of a road network with unbounded price of anarchy
(Fig. 2). Consider a network of two parallel roads, with road
latency functions c1(x, y) = 1 and c2(x, y) = ζx. On each
road the latency is a function of the human-driven flow (x)
and the autonomous flow (y) on that road. Suppose we have
1
ζ units of human-driven vehicle flow and 1 unit of autonomous
traffic demand to cross from node s to node t, with ζ ≥ 1.
Optimal routing puts all human-driven cars on the top road
and all autonomous cars on the bottom road; when vehicles
route selfishly they all end up on the bottom road. This yields
a price of anarchy of ζ+1. The bicriteria is also ζ+1, as ζ+1
times as much traffic, optimally routed, yields the same total
cost as the original amount of traffic at Wardrop Equilibrium.1
This examples leads us already to our first proposition, which
lays the foundations for the contributions of this paper:
Proposition 1. The price of anarchy and bicriteria are in
general unbounded in mixed autonomy.
Motivated by this proposition, we develop the notion of the
degree of asymmetry of a road and use this, in conjunction with
the degree of the polynomial cost function, to parameterize the
bound on the price of anarchy. To summarize, we
1Though in this case autonomous vehicles do not affect congestion, other
examples in Section V also yield an unbounded PoA with both vehicle types
affecting congestion.
1) show that previous PoA results do not hold for mixed
autonomy,
2) develop a realistic class of polynomial cost functions for
traffic of mixed autonomy,
3) develop two mechanisms for bounding the PoA using this
cost function with both capacity models, and
4) bound the price of anarchy and bicriteria and analyze the
tightness of our bounds.
Some of the contributions above are related to our previous
work. In one previous paper, we use similar capacity models
along with a latency function based on M/M/1 queues to find
optimal routing for human-driven and autonomous vehicles
over two parallel roads [14]. In another work, we consider
maximizing capacity, using the second capacity model in
this paper, via a sequence of vehicle reorderings in which
autonomous vehicles influence human drivers [13].
In this paper we expand on conference version, which con-
siders the price of anarchy and bicriteria in mixed autonomy
with affine latency functions [15]. The derivation considers the
first capacity model in conjunction with a latency function that
can be considered as a special case of the latency function
presented in this paper, with polynomial degree one. The
bound presented in that paper corresponds to that of Theorems
2 and 3, limited to polynomials of degree one. In the current
work we consider a broader class of latency functions that
includes both capacity models and latency functions with
arbitrary polynomial degree. We expand the previous bounds
to include this broader class of latency functions. However,
this bound only holds under certain regimes for the allowable
parameters of the capacity model and latency functions. In
response, we present a PoA bound that holds in all regimes
and is tighter even in some regimes in which the previous
bound holds.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Congestion Games and Wardrop Equilibria
Our work is related to the optimal traffic assignment prob-
lem, e.g. [16], which studies how to optimally route vehicles
on a network when the cost (i.e. delay) on a road link is
a function of the vehicles that travel on that link. We are
concerned specifically with the relationship between optimal
traffic assignment and Wardrop Equilibria, which occur when
drivers choose their paths selfishly. For a survey on literature
on Wardrop Equilibria, see [17]; [18] describes other notions
of equilibria. Classic works on Wardrop Equilibria and the
associated tools for analyzing them include [19]–[21].
In an important development, Smith [19] establishes the
widely used variational inequality and uses it to describe flows
at Wardrop Equilibrium, in which all users sharing an origin
and destination use paths of equal cost and no unused path
has a smaller cost. For any feasible flow z and equilibrium
flow zEQ, the variational inequality dictates that
〈c(zEQ), zEQ − z〉 ≤ 0 , (1)
where z is a vector describing vehicle flow on each road
and c(z) maps a vector of flows to a vector of the delay
on each road. The Variational Inequality is fundamental for
establishing our PoA bound. In the case of mixed autonomy
each road is duplicated to account for the two types of traffic;
a full description is provided in Section III.
B. Multiclass Traffic
Some previous works consider traffic assignment and
Wardrop Equilibria with multiclass traffic, meaning traffic with
multiple vehicle types and transportation modes that affect and
experience congestion differently (e.g. [22]–[24]).
Florian [24] demonstrates how to calculate equilibria for a
multimodal system involving personal automobiles and public
transportation. They use a relaxation that assumes public
transportation will take the path that would be shortest in the
absence of cars. In the case of mixed autonomy, this is not a
fair assumption.
Dafermos [22] assumes the Jacobian of the cost function is
symmetric and positive definite. Similarly, Hearn et. al. [23]
deal with a monotone cost function, i.e. satisfying the property
〈c(z)− c(q), z − q〉 ≥ 0 (2)
for flow vectors z and q.
However, traffic networks with mixed autonomy are in gen-
eral nonmonotone. To see this, consider a network of two roads
with costs c1(x, y) = 3x+y+ t1 and c2(x, y) = 3x+2y+ t2,
where t1 and t2 are constants denoting the free-flow latency on
roads 1 and 2. This corresponds to a road in which autonomous
vehicles can platoon closely and another road on which they
cannot platoon as closely. The Jacobian of the cost function
is as follows: 
3 1 0 0
3 1 0 0
0 0 3 2
0 0 3 2
 ,
which is not symmetric, and the vector z =
[−1 2 0 0]T
demonstrates that it is also not positive semidefinite. Mono-
tonicity is closely related to the positive (semi-) definiteness
of the Jacobian of the cost function. To show that the mono-
tonicity condition is violated as well, consider that there are 2
units of human-driven flow demand and 3 units autonomous
flow demand. With one routing in which all human-driven
flow is on the first road and all autonomous flow is on the
second and another routing with these reversed, we find that
the monotonicity condition is violated.
Similarly, Faroukhi et. al. [25] prove that in heterogeneous
routing games with cost functions that are continuously dif-
ferentiable, nonnegative for feasible flows, and nondecreasing
in each of their arguments, then at least one equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist. These mild conditions are satisfied in our
setting. For heterogeneous games with two types, they further
prove a necessary and sufficient condition for a potential
function (and therefore unique equilibrium) to exist. However,
the condition required can be considered a relaxation of the
condition that the Jacobian of the cost function be symmetric.
While broader than strict symmetry, this condition is still not
satisfied in mixed autonomy. Notably, they describe tolls that,
when applied, yield a cost function that satisfies this condition.
As described above, these previous works in multiclass
traffic require restrictive assumptions and therefore do not
apply to the case of mixed autonomy. In fact, in the case of
mixed autonomy, the routing game is not formally a proper
congestion game, as it cannot be described with a potential
function. Nonetheless, in this paper we adapt tools developed
for such games to derive results for mixed autonomous traffic.
C. Price of Anarchy
There is an abundance of research into the price of anarchy
in nonatomic congestion games, codified in [5]–[10]. In [10],
the authors develop a general tool for analyzing price of
anarchy in nonatomic congestion games. Though their devel-
opment is specific to monotone cost functions, in this paper we
broaden it to cost functions that are not necessarily monotone.
Also relatedly, we find that in the case of no asymmetry,
our price of anarchy bound for polynomial cost functions
simplifies to the classic bound in [6]–[8].
The previously mentioned works consider primarily single-
type traffic. Perakis [11] considers PoA in multiclass traffic
using nonseparable, asymmetric, nonlinear cost functions with
inelastic demand. However, they restrict their analysis to the
case that the Jacobian matrix of the cost function is positive
semidefinite. Similarly, Chau and Sim [12] consider the PoA
for multiclass traffic with elastic demand with symmetric cost
functions and positive semidefinite Jacobian of the cost func-
tion. As demonstrated earlier, these assumptions are violated
in the case of mixed autonomy.
D. Autonomy
In one line of research, autonomous vehicles are controlled
to locally improve traffic by smoothing out stop-and-go shock-
waves in congested traffic [3], [26]–[34], optimally sending
platooned vehicles through highway bottlenecks [34], [35], and
simultaneously accelerating platooned vehicles at signalized
intersections [2], [4]. Other papers investigate fuel savings
attained using autonomous vehicles [36]–[39] or jointly con-
trolling vehicles on a highway to localize and eliminate traffic
disturbances [40]. Some works consider optimally routing and
rebalancing a fleet of autonomous vehicles [41], though these
generally consider a simpler model for congestion, in which
capacitated roads have constant latency for flows below their
capacity.
Some previous works have related models for road capacity
and throughput under mixed autonomy, in particular [4], [42],
[13]–[15]. In our previous work [15], we found the price of
anarchy for affine cost functions with one capacity model. This
is a special case of our work in this paper, which goes beyond
the previous work by considering polynomial cost functions
and incorporating both capacity models. Further, we introduce
a novel mechanism for finding the PoA in mixed autonomy,
leading to a tighter bound than the one previously found.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Consider a congestion game on a network of N roads,
with nonatomic drivers (meaning each control an infinitesi-
mally small unit of vehicle flow) traveling across m origin-
destination pairs, each pair associated with αi units of human-
driven vehicle flow demand and βi units of autonomous
vehicle flow demand. We use [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} to denote the
set of roads. We fully describe driver behavior on a network by
using a vector of vehicle flows, which describes the volume of
vehicles of each type that travels on each road. This vector has
size equal to twice the number of roads and uses alternating
entries to denote human-driven and autonomous vehicle flow
on a road. We use xi and yi to refer to human-driven and
autonomous flow on road i, respectively. Then the flow vector
z is as follows:
z =
[
x1 y1 x2 y2 . . . xn yn
]T ∈ R2N≥0 .
We refer to this flow vector as a routing or a strategy. We
use X ⊆ R2N≥0 to denote the set of feasible routings, meaning
routings that route all flow demand from their origin nodes to
their destination nodes while respecting conservation of flow
in the network.
When needing to distinguish between two vectors, we use
vi and wi in place of xi and yi and q in place of z. We as-
sume that human-driven and autonomous vehicles experience
congestion identically. To capture the differing effects of each
type of flow on a road’s latency, we construct cost function
c(z) : R2N≥0 → R2N≥0 as follows:
c(z) =

c1(x1, y1)
c1(x1, y1)
c2(x2, y2)
c2(x2, y2)
. . .
cn(xn, yn)
cn(xn, yn)

,
where ci(xi, yi) is the latency on road i when xi units of
human-driven vehicles and yi units of autonomous vehicles
use the road. The social cost, which is the aggregate delay
experienced by all users of the network, is then C(z) :=
〈c(z), z〉. In the following sections we develop models for road
capacity and road delay in order to construct cost functions.
A. Capacity Models
We model the capacity of a road under two assumptions: 1)
autonomous vehicles can platoon (follow closely) behind any
vehicle and 2) autonomous vehicles can only platoon behind
other autonomous vehicles. Let di denote road length and let
h¯i and hi denote the nominal space taken up by a platooned
and nonplatooned vehicle, respectively. The capacity will be a
function of the autonomy level of the road, denoted α(xi, yi) =
yi/(xi + yi). We define the capacity of a road as the number
of vehicles, traveling at the road’s nominal speed, that can fit
on the length of the road. This is calculated by dividing the
length of the road by the average space taken up by a car on
the road, which is a function of autonomy level. We formalize
this in the following proposition2.
2Found in [14], contemporaneously in [42].
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Fig. 3: Capacity models 1 and 2. In capacity model 1 (left), autonomous
cars can platoon behind any vehicle, and therefore take up length h¯. In
capacity model 2 (right), autonomous vehicles can only platoon behind other
autonomous vehicles; in that case they take up length h¯, but if following a
human-driven vehicle, they take up length h. Human-driven vehicles always
take up length h.
Proposition 2. Assume that vehicles are placed on a road as
the result of a Bernoulli process. If autonomous vehicles can
platoon behind any vehicle, therefore occupying road length h¯i
when traveling at nominal velocity, and human driven vehicles
do not platoon (therefore occupying road length hi at nominal
velocity), then the capacity is
mi(xi, yi) =
di
α(xi, yi)h¯i + (1− α(xi, yi))hi
. (3)
If autonomous vehicles only platoon behind other autonomous
vehicles and human driven vehicles cannot platoon, then the
capacity is
mi(xi, yi) =
di
α2(xi, yi)h¯i + (1− α2(xi, yi))hi
. (4)
Proof. We first justify the proposition for the first capacity
model. Autonomous vehicles follow any vehicle with the
same headway (occupying total space h¯i), as do human-driven
vehicles with a different headway (occupying hi). The space
taken up by an average vehicle, as the number of vehicles
grows large, is a weighted combination of those two spacings
that depends on the autonomy level. Note that this capacity
model does not depend on the ordering of the vehicles.
For the second capacity model, we assume the vehicles are
placed as the result of a Bernoulli process with parameter αi.
Consider M vehicles, each with length L, with sm denoting
the headway of vehicle m. Note that the front vehicle will
have sm = 0. The expected total space taken up is, due to
linearity of expectation,
E[
M∑
m=1
L+ sm] = ML+
M−1∑
m=1
E[sm]
= (M − 1)(α2(xi, yi)h¯i + (1− α2(xi, yi))h) + L .
Then, as the number of vehicles grows large, the average
space occupied by a vehicle approaches α2(xi, yi)h¯i + (1 −
α2(xi, yi))h, yielding the above expression for capacity model
2.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the technology assump-
tions.To make the meaning of nominal vehicle spacing more
concrete, we offer one way of calculating spacing: let L denote
vehicle length, τh,i and τa,i denote the reaction speed of
human-driven and autonomous vehicles, respectively. Let vi be
the nominal speed on road i, which is likely the road’s speed
limit. Then we consider h¯i = L+viτa,i and hi = L+viτh,i.3
B. Delay Model
We now propose a model for the delay incurred by mixed
traffic resulting from the capacity models derived in the
previous subsection. We base our road delay function on that
used in the Traffic Assignment Manual, published in 1964 by
the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) [24], [43], [44]. In a review
of link capacity and cost functions [45], this cost function is
analyzed and compared to alternate analytically difficult cost
functions; the authors find the BPR cost function incurs little
or no loss in accuracy compared to more complicated models.
We are concerned with the total, or aggregate, delay for
all drivers on the network. Motivated by the delay function
described in the Bureau of Public Roads’ Traffic Assignment
Manual [24], [43], [44], we propose the following road delay
function for mixed autonomous traffic:
ci(xi, yi) = ti(1 + ρi(
xi + yi
mi(xi, yi)
)σi) . (5)
Here, ti denotes the free-flow delay on road i, and ρi and
σi are model parameters. Typical values for ρi and σi are 0.15
and 4, respectively [44]. However, our solution methodology is
valid for any parameters such that ti ≥ 0, ρi ≥ 0 and σi ≥ 1.
We extend the BPR cost function by considering total flow on
a road, and parameterize the capacity by the autonomy level
of the flow on a road.
Remark 1. This choice of cost functions implies that road
delay is separable, meaning that the congestion on one road
does not affect that on another. In the conference version of
this paper [15], we bound the price of anarchy and bicriteria
for some nonseparable affine cost functions.
The class of cost functions we consider are not monotone,
meaning they do not necessarily satisfy (2), but are element-
wise monotone, defined below:
3In general we consider hi ≥ h¯i, but we do not formally make this
assumption. Our theoretical results hold even in the case that hi ≥ h¯i on
some roads and hj < h¯j on others.
Definition 1. A cost function c : R2n≥0 → R2n≥0 is elementwise
monotone if it is nondecreasing in each of its arguments, i.e.
dci(z)
dzj
≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ [2n].
IV. BOUNDING THE PRICE OF ANARCHY
In this section we bound the price of anarchy and bicriteria
of traffic networks under mixed autonomy. As established in
the introduction, the PoA is in general unbounded in traffic
networks with mixed autonomy. However, we can establish a
bound for the PoA by parameterizing it using the parameters
defined below.
Definition 2. The degree of asymmetry on a road is the
maximum ratio of road space utilized by a car of one type
to a car of another type on the same road, while traveling
at nominal velocity. The maximum degree of asymmetry, k,
is the maximum of the above quantity over all roads in the
network. Formally, k := maxi∈[n] max(hi/h¯i, h¯i/hi).
Note that we do not assume that one vehicle type affects
congestion more than another type on all roads. For exam-
ple, autonomous vehicles may require shorter headways than
human-driven vehicles on highways but longer headways on
neighborhood roads to maintain safety for pedestrians.
Definition 3. The maximum polynomial degree, denoted σ,
for a road network with cost functions in the form (5), is
the maximum degree of a polynomial denoting the cost on all
roads in the network: σ = maxi∈[n] σi.
We use Ck,σ to denote the class of cost functions of the form
(5), with maximum degree of asymmetry k and maximum
polynomial degree σ, with cost functions using mi from either
capacity mode 1 in (3) or capacity model 2 in (4). Let
ξ(σ) := σ(σ + 1)−
σ+1
σ . (6)
Note that for σ ≥ 1, ξ(σ) < 1. With this, we present our first
bound.
Theorem 1. Consider a class of nonatomic congestion games
with cost functions drawn from Ck,σ . Let zEQ be an equilib-
rium and zOPT be a social optimum for this game. Then,
C(zEQ) ≤ k
σ
1− ξ(σ)C(z
OPT ) .
Proof. Given any road cost function c (and social cost C) and
equilibrium zEQ, we define an aggregate cost function cAGG
(and social cost CAGG) with corresponding equilibrium flow
fEQ, both parameterized by zEQ. This allows us to combine
human-driven and autonomous flow into one flow type in
the aggregate function so we can bound the price of anarchy
for the aggregate cost function. We then find the relationship
between the optimal routing for the aggregate cost function to
that of the original cost function. Formally, the steps of the
proof are:
C(zEQ) = CAGG(fEQ) (7)
≤ 1
1− ξ(σ)C
AGG(fOPT) (8)
≤ 1
1− ξ(σ)k
σC(zOPT) . (9)
We begin by introducing the tool with which we bound the
PoA in (8). We then define cAGG and fEQ such that (7) holds
and show that fEQ is an equilibrium for cAGG. We discuss
the structure of the tool used to bound the PoA and provide
an intuitive explanation of how the chosen structure of cAGG
leads to a tighter PoA bound than an alternative choice. We
then provide lemmas corresponding to inequality (8), which
bounds the price of anarchy of this new cost function, and (9),
which relates the social cost of optimal routing under cAGG to
that of the original cost function, c. We defer proofs of the
lemmas to the appendix.
We first introduce a general tool that we use for our results
by extending the framework established by Correa et. al. [10],
which relies on the Variational Inequality to bound the price
of anarchy. We use the following parameters:
β(c, q) := max
z∈R2N≥0
〈c(q)− c(z), z〉
〈c(q), q〉 ,
β(C) := sup
c∈C,q∈X
β(c, q) , (10)
where 0/0=0 by definition, and C is the class of network cost
functions being considered. Then,
Lemma 1. Let zEQ be an equilibrium of a nonatomic con-
gestion game with cost functions drawn from a class C of
elementwise monotone cost functions.
(a) If zOPT is a social optimum for this game and β(C) < 1,
then
C(zEQ) ≤ (1− β(C))−1C(zOPT ) .
(b) If qOPT is a social optimum for the same game with 1 +
β(C) times as much flow demand of each type, then
C(zEQ) ≤ C(qOPT ) .
The lemma and proof are nearly identical to that of Correa
et. al. [10], extended to encompass nonmonotone, yet elemen-
twise monotone, cost functions.
We now explain our choice of cAGG and fOPT that yields
(7) then provide an intuitive explanation for this choice. Recall
that we define
zEQ =
[
xEQ1 y
EQ
1 x
EQ
2 y
EQ
2 . . . x
EQ
n y
EQ
n
]T
.
We define a new flow vector which aggregates the regular
and autonomous flows: fEQ = xEQ + yEQ, where zEQ ∈ R2N≥0
and xEQ, yEQ, fEQ ∈ RN≥0. We define a new cost function cAGG
that is a mapping from flow vector (with one flow for each
road) to road latencies, i.e. cAGG : RN≥0 → RN≥0. We define
cAGG so that it has the same road costs with flow fEQ as c
does with flow zEQ. Note, however, that c is a mapping from
flows, with two flow types per road, to road latencies, again
with each road represented twice (c : R2N≥0 → R2N≥0 ). However,
cAGG represents each road once.
We formally define cAGG, which depends on the equilibrium
flow being considered, zEQ. This cost function is defined for
both capacity models. In general terms, cAGG adds the “costly”
xi
EQ
, road cost
, traffic flow
xi
EQ + yi
EQ := fi
EQ
ci
AGG ( fi )
fi
Fig. 4: Illustration of the geometric interpretation of the parameter β(CAGG)
where CAGG represents the class of aggregate cost functions. Parameter
β(CAGG) is an upper bound on the ratio between the size of the shaded
rectangle with the dashed rectangle. This is an upper bound over all choices
of cAGGi ∈ CAGG and xEQ and yEQ ≥ 0.
type of vehicle flow first, then adds the “less costly” vehicle
flow. If h¯i ≤ hi,
cAGGi,1 (fi) := (11){
ti(1 + ρi(
hifi
di
)σi) fi ≤ xEQi
ti(1 + ρi(
h¯ifi+(hi−h¯i)xEQi
di
)σi) fi > x
EQ
i
cAGGi,2 (fi) := (12){
ti(1 + ρi(
hifi
di
)σi) fi ≤ xEQi
ti(1 + ρi(
hif
2
i −(hi−h¯i)(fi−xEQi )2
difi
)σi) fi > x
EQ
i
If h¯i > hi, then swap h¯i and hi above, and replace x
EQ
i with
yEQi . In all cases, c
AGG
i (f
EQ
i ) = cj(x
EQ
j , y
EQ
j ), where j ∈ [2n]
and i = dj/2e ∈ [n]. Since the road latencies under cAGG(fEQ)
are the same as under c(zEQ), fEQ is an equilibrium for cAGG.
To provide some intuition as to why we add the “costly”
vehicle type first, consider the affine case with the first capacity
model. Correa et. al. give a geometric interpretation of the
parameter β(CAGG) when cost are separable, meaning road
latency only depends on one element of the flow vector. They
show that for any cost function drawn from CAGG, β(CAGG)
provides an upper bound on the ratio of the area of a rectangle
above the cost function curve to the area of a rectangle
enclosing it, where the enclosing rectangle has one corner at
the origin. See Figure 4 for an illustration.
This interpretation provides the intuition that the more
convex a function can be, the greater β(CAGG) can grow.
Thus, to make our bound as tight as possible in our case,
we add the costly vehicle type first. In the affine case with
the first capacity model, this makes the class of cost functions
concave. Then the element of this class that maximizes the
size of the interior rectangle relative to the exterior rectangle
minimizes the concavity of the function by setting xEQ = 0 or
yEQ = 0. Thus, the PoA bound does not depend on the degree
of asymmetry. Though this exact interpretation does not apply
for σ > 1 or for the second capacity model, the intuition is
nonetheless useful.
With this intuition, we now present inequalities (8) and (9)
as a lemmas.
Lemma 2. Consider a nonatomic congestion game with
road cost functions of the form (11) or (12), with maximum
polynomial degree σ. Then,
CAGG(fEQ) ≤ 1
1− ξ(σ)C
AGG(fOPT)
where ξ(σ) = σ(σ + 1)−
σ+1
σ .
Lemma 3. Let c be a cost function composed of road costs
of the form (5) with maximum degree of asymmetry k and
maximum polynomial degree σ. Let cAGG be an aggregate cost
function of c, as defined in (11) and (12). Let the flow vector
zOPT be a minimizer of C and fOPT be a minimizer of CAGG,
with
∑
i∈[2n] z
OPT
i =
∑
i∈[n] f
OPT
i . Then,
CAGG(fOPT) ≤ kσC(zOPT) .
We prove Lemma 2 by bounding β(C) for the class of
aggregate cost functions and applying Lemma 1. We analyze
the structures of c and cAGG to prove Lemma 3. With these
lemmas, the theorem is proved.
Note that for k = 1 (i.e. no asymmetry), the price of anarchy
bound simplifies to those in [6]–[8]. If the cost functions are
affine and there is no asymmetry, this reduces to the classic 43
bound [5]. We characterize the tightness of this bound in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. Given a maximum polynomial degree σ, the PoA
bound is order-optimal with respect to the maximum degree
of asymmetry k.
We provide an example proving the corollary in Section V.
When considering road networks with low asymmetry, we can
establish another bound.
Theorem 2. Consider a class of nonatomic congestion games
with cost functions drawn from Ck,σ . Let zEQ be an equilib-
rium and zOPT a social optimum for this game. If kξ(σ) < 1,
then
C(zEQ) ≤ 1
1− kξ(σ)C(z
OPT ) .
Proof. To prove this theorem, instead of going through an
aggregate cost function we directly find β(C) for our class of
cost functions and apply Lemma 1. We do this in two two
lemmas: we first find a relationship between the parameter
β(c, v) and the road capacity model mi(xi, yi), then we bound
the resulting expression.
Lemma 4. For cost functions of the form (5), the parameter
β(C) is bounded by
β(C) ≤ max
i∈[n],qi,zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− (mi(vi, wi)(xi + yi)
mi(xi, yi)(vi + wi)
)σ)
Lemma 5. For capacities of the forms (3) or (4),
max
i∈[n],qi,zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− (mi(vi, wi)(xi + yi)
mi(xi, yi)(vi + wi)
)σ) ≤ kξ(σ)
s t
c1(x, y) = (kx+ y)
σ
c2(x, y) = (x+ ky)
σ
Fig. 5: Example road network with two sided asymmetry (above) and
comparison of price of anarchy with upper bound (below). One unit of human-
driven and one unit of autonomous flow cross from node s to node t.
These lemmas, together with Lemma 1, prove the theorem
as well as Theorem 3 below.
Note that this bound may not necessarily be tighter in
all regimes so our new PoA bound is min( k
σ
1−ξ(σ) ,
1
1−kξ(σ) ).
Though we cannot in closed form determine the region for
which it is tighter, we can do so numerically. For example,
for affine cost functions with k = 2, k
σ
1−ξ(σ) =
8
3 and
1
1−kξ(σ) = 2. In Section V we show via example that the
bound in Theorem 2 is tight in this case.
The method used for establishing Theorem 2 also gives a
bound on the bicriteria, stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider a class of nonatomic congestion games
with cost functions drawn from Ck,σ . Let zEQ be an equilibrium
for this game. If qOPT is a social optimum for the same game
with 1 + kξ(σ) times as much flow demand of each type, then
C(zEQ) ≤ C(qOPT) .
To give an example, if road delays are described by polyno-
mials of degree 4, and the maximum asymmetry between the
spacing of platooned and nonplatooned vehicles is 3, then the
the cost of selfishly routing vehicles will be less than optimally
routing 1 + 3 ξ(4) ≈ 2.61 times as much vehicle flow of each
type.
V. ESTABLISHING LOWER BOUNDS BY EXAMPLE
In this section we provide examples that give a lower bound
on the price of anarchy for this class of networks and serve
to illustrate the tightness of the bounds. We discuss notions
s t
c1(x, y) = 1
c2(x, y) =
k√
k+1
x+ 1√
k+1
y
Fig. 6: Example road network with one sided asymmetry (above) and
comparison of price of anarchy with upper bound for σ = 1 (below). 1√
k
units of human-driven flow and one unit of autonomous flow cross from node
s to t.
Fig. 7: Bicriteria of networks in Figures 5 (with σ = 1) and 6, compared
with the bicriteria bound.
of one-sided and two-sided asymmetry: a network has one
sided asymmetry if h¯i ≤ hi ∀i ∈ [n] (human-driven cars
always contribute more to congestion than autonomous cars)
or h¯i ≥ hi ∀i ∈ [n] (human-driven cars always contribute less
to congestion than autonomous cars); otherwise the network
has two-sided asymmetry. We provide two example networks,
one with two-sided asymmetry (Fig. 5) and one with one-sided
asymmetry (Fig. 6). We compare the price of anarchy and
bicriteria in those networks to the upper bounds established
earlier.
Example 1. Consider the network of parallel roads in Fig. 5,
where one unit of human-driven and one unit of autonomous
flow wish to cross from node s to t. The roads have costs
c1(x, y) = (kx + y)
σ and c2(x, y) = (x + ky)σ . In worst-
case equilibrium, all human-driven cars are on the top road
and all autonomous cars are on the bottom road. In the best
case, these routing are reversed. This yields a PoA of kσ . To
find the bicriteria, we calculate how much traffic, optimally
routed, yields a cost equal to 2kσ , the cost of the original
traffic volume at worst-case equilibrium. We find that k
σ
σ+1 as
much traffic, optimally routed, yields this same cost.
Example 2. Consider the network of parallel roads in Figure
6, where 1√
k
unit of human-driven and one unit of autonomous
flow wish to cross from node s to t. The roads have costs
c1(x, y) = 1 and c2(x, y) = k√k+1x+
1√
k+1
y. At equilibrium,
all vehicles take the bottom road; optimally routed, human-
driven vehicles takes the top road and autonomous vehicles
take the bottom. This yields a price of anarchy of 1 + k
2
√
k+1
.
Calculations similar to that in Example 1 yield a bicriteria of
(−1+
√
1+4
√
k)(1+
√
k)
2
√
k
.
For affine cost functions, σ = 1 so ξ = 1/4. The PoA bound
is then min( 44−k ,
4
3k) and the bicriteria bound is 1+k/4. With
σ = 1, the first example has PoA k and bicriteria
√
k, and the
second example has PoA of order
√
k and bicriteria of order
k1/4. Accordingly, the first example shows that the PoA bound
is tight for k = 2 and the bicriteria bound is tight for k = 4.
Note that a realistic range for k is between 1 and 4.
Further, for affine cost functions, the bound in Theorem 2 is
tighter than that of Theorem 1 when the degree of asymmetry
is low. However, the bound in Theorem 1 scales much better
for high degrees of asymmetry. This effect is accentuated for
cost functions that have higher order polynomials – the regime
for which the bound in Theorem 2 is tighter shrinks as the
maximum polynomial degree grows.
As stated in Corollary 1, our bound is order-optimal with
respect to the maximum degree of asymmetry, k. Comparing
the bound ( k
σ
1−ξ(σ) ) with the PoA in Example 1 (k
σ) shows
that for a fixed σ, the PoA upper bound is within a constant
factor of the lower bound, implying that the upper bound is
order-optimal in k.
It is also worth noting that under the construction used in
Theorems 2, the bicriteria is related to the price of anarchy
through the quantity β(C) [10]. Observe that Example 1
provides a bicriteria of 2 for k = 4, implying β(C4) ≥ 1. Since
the PoA is greater than or equal to 11−β(C) , this mechanism
cannot bound the PoA for k ≥ 4. This leads us to rely on the
mechanism developed for Theorem 1 for networks with large
asymmetry.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we present a framework, similar to a con-
gestion game, for considering traffic networks with mixed
autonomy. To do so we present two models for the capacity
of roads with mixed autonomy, each corresponding to an
assumption about the technological capabilities of autonomous
vehicles, and we define a class of road latency functions that
incorporates these capacity models. Using this framework, we
develop two methods of bounding the price of anarchy and
show that these bounds depend on the degree of the poly-
nomial describing latency and the difference in the degree to
which platooned and nonplatooned vehicles occupy space on a
road. In addition we present a bound on the bicriteria, another
measure of inefficiency due to selfish routing. We present
examples showing these bounds are tight in some cases and
recover classical bounds when human-driven and autonomous
vehicles affect congestion the same way. Moreover, we show
that our PoA bound is order-optimal with respect to the degree
to which vehicle types differently affect congestion.
Some limitations of the work are as follows. The capacity
models presented assume that vehicle types are determined as
a result of a Bernoulli process; a more general capacity model
could incorporate autonomous vehicles that actively rearrange
themselves as to form platoons. Further, the road latency
model assumes that latency increases with increasing flow.
This does not incorporate the notion of congestion described
by the fundamental diagram of traffic, in which a road can
have both low flow and high latency if vehicle density is high.
Similarly, autonomous vehicles can affect congestion in ways
not limited to platooning. In addition, our proposed latency
function considers only the effect of a vehicle on the road
upon which it travels; a more general latency function would
consider interaction between roads. Finally, the PoA bound is
not shown to be tight but is order-optimal in the degree of
asymmetry k, and a future work could aim to close this gap.
Nonetheless, this is a framework that can be used in the future
for studying traffic networks in mixed autonomy.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
To prove part (a),
〈c(qEQ), z〉 = 〈c(z), z〉+ 〈c(qEQ)− c(z), z〉
≤ 〈c(z), z〉+ β(c, qEQ)〈c(qEQ), qEQ〉
≤ C(z) + β(C)C(qEQ) (13)
and by the Variational Inequality, C(qEQ) ≤ 〈c(qEQ), z〉 for
any feasible routing z. Completing the proof requires that
β(C) ≤ 1, then replace the generic z with zOPT.
To prove part (b), element-wise monotonicity implies the
feasibility of (1+β(C))−1qOPT, which routes the same volume
of traffic as zEQ. Using (1),
〈c(zEQ), zEQ〉 ≤ 〈c(zEQ), (1 + β(C))−1qOPT〉 . (14)
Then,
C(zEQ) = (1 + β(C))〈c(zEQ), zEQ〉
− β(C)〈c(zEQ), zEQ〉 (15)
≤ (1 + β(C))〈c(zEQ), (1 + β(C))−1qOPT〉
− β(C)〈c(zEQ), zEQ〉 (16)
≤ C(qOPT) , (17)
where (16) uses (14) and (17) uses (13).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We use Lemma 1 and bound β(CAGGσ ), where CAGGσ denotes
the set of aggregate cost functions with maximum polynomial
degree σ. First we will show that
β(CAGGσ ) ≤ max
i∈[n],fi,gi≥0
fi
gi
(1− (fi
gi
)σi) .
For the remainder of the proof of the lemma, we drop the
aggregate superscript from aggregate cost functions. Then,
β(CAGGσ ) := sup
c∈CAGGσ ,g∈X
max
f∈Rn≥0
〈c(g)− c(f), f〉
〈c(g), c(g)〉
≤ sup
ci∈CAGGσ ,gi≥0
max
fi≥0
fi
gi
(1− ci(fi)
ci(gi)
) .
We will show that β(CAGGσ ) ≤ maxi∈[n],fi,gi≥0 figi (1− (
fi
gi
)σi)
by showing that ci(fi)ci(gi) ≥ (
fi
gi
)σi for either capacity model. We
will show this for a road in which h¯i ≤ hi, though with the
alterations discussed above, the same can be done for a road
on which h¯i > hi.
Note that we are considering the supremum of g in the set of
feasible routings for c. Accordingly, we need to consider cases
in which gi ≤ xEQi , as well as gi > xEQi . However, gi must
be greater than fi, as β(CAGGk,σ ) ≥ 0 and ci is nondecreasing.
We therefore do not need to consider cases in which gi ≤ xEQi
and fi > x
EQ
i .
All together, we must bound six cases:
1) capacity model 1, gi ≤ xEQi and fi ≤ xEQi ,
2) capacity model 1, gi > x
EQ
i and fi ≤ xEQi ,
3) capacity model 1, gi > x
EQ
i and fi > x
EQ
i ,
4) capacity model 2, gi ≤ xEQi and fi ≤ xEQi ,
5) capacity model 2, gi > x
EQ
i and fi ≤ xEQi ,
6) capacity model 2, gi > x
EQ
i and fi > x
EQ
i ,
We will show that in all cases, ci(fi)ci(gi) ≥ (
fi
gi
)σi .
In the first case,
ci,1(fi)
ci,1(gi)
=
1 + ρi(
hifi
di
)σi
1 + ρi(
higi
di
)σi
≥ (fi
gi
)σi , (18)
where (18) follows from ci,1(fi)ci,1(gi) ≤ 1. In the following cases
we perform the same operation without comment.
In the second case,
ci,1(fi)
ci,1(gi)
≥ ( hifi
h¯igi + (hi − h¯i)xEQi
)σi
≥ (hifi
h¯igi
)σi
≥ (fi
gi
)σi , (19)
where (19) follows from h¯i ≤ hi.
In the third case,
ci,1(fi)
ci,1(gi)
≥ ( h¯ifi + (hi − h¯i)x
EQ
i
h¯igi + (hi − h¯i)xEQi
)σi
≥ (fi
gi
)σi , (20)
where (20) follows from hi ≥ h¯i and fi ≤ gi.
The fourth case is equivalent to the first case. In the fifth
case,
ci,2(fi)
ci,2(gi)
≥ ( hifigi
hi(gi)2 − (hi − h¯i)(gi − xEQi )2
)σi
≥ ( hifigi
hi(gi)2
)σi = (
fi
gi
)σi , (21)
where (21) results from hi ≥ h¯i.
In the sixth case,
ci,2(fi)
ci,2(gi)
≥ (hi(fi)
2 − (hi − h¯i)(fi − xEQi )2
hi(gi)2 − (hi − h¯i)(gi − xEQi )2
× gi
fi
)σi
≥ (hi(fi)
2
hi(gi)2
× gi
fi
)σi = (
fi
gi
)σi , (22)
where (22) results from ( figi )
2 ≥ ( fi−x
EQ
i
gi−xEQi
)2, as gi ≥ fi.
Now that we have shown that ci(fi)ci(gi) ≥ (
fi
gi
)σi in all cases,
we find that
β(CAGGσ ) ≤ max
i∈[n],fi,gi≥0
fi
gi
− (fi
gi
)σi+1 .
As this expression is concave with respect to fi, to max-
imize this with respect to fi, we set the derivative of this
expression with respect to fi to 0:
1
gi
− (σ + 1) (f
∗
i )
σ
(gi)σ+1
= 0
=⇒ f∗i = (gi)(σ + 1)−
1
σ .
Plugging this in,
β(CAGGσ ) ≤ (σ + 1)−
1
σ (1− 1
σ + 1
)
= σ(σ + 1)−
σ+1
σ
This, combined with Lemma 1 and the definition of ξ(σ),
completes the proof of the lemma.
C. Proof of Lemma 3
As before, let
z =
[
x1 y1 x2 y2 . . . xn yn
]T
.
Then,
kσci(x
OPT
i , y
OPT
i )
≥ max(ci(xOPTi + yOPTi , 0), ci(0, xOPTi + yOPTi ))
≥ cAGGi (xOPTi + yOPTi ) .
and by definition of fOPT, CAGG(f) ≥ CAGG(fOPT) for any
feasible vector f with
∑
i∈[n] f
OPT
i =
∑
i∈[n] fi, so
kσC(zOPT) ≥
∑
i∈[n]
(xOPTi + y
OPT
i )c
AGG
i (x
OPT + yOPT)
≥ CAGG(fOPT) .
D. Proof of Lemma 4
Using (10),
β(c, q)
= max
zi∈R2n≥0
∑
i∈[n] tiρi[(
vi+wi
mi(vi,wi)
)σi − ( xi+yimi(xi,yi) )σi ](xi + yi)∑
i∈[n] ti[1 + ρi(
vi+wi
mi(vi,wi)
)σi ](vi + wi)
≤ max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
ρi[(
vi+wi
mi(vi,wi)
)σi − ( xi+yimi(xi,yi) )σi ](xi + yi)
[1 + ρi(
vi+wi
mi(vi,wi)
)σi ](vi + wi)
≤ max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
[( vi+wimi(vi,wi) )
σi − ( xi+yimi(xi,yi) )σi ](xi + yi)
( vi+wimi(vi,wi) )
σi(vi + wi)
= max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− (mi(vi, wi)(xi + yi)
mi(xi, yi)(vi + wi)
)σi)
≤ max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− (mi(vi, wi)(xi + yi)
mi(xi, yi)(vi + wi)
)σ) , (23)
where β(c, q) ≥ 0 implies (23), allowing us to consider only
the maximum allowable degree of polynomial.
E. Proof of Lemma 5
For capacity model 1:
β(c, q) (24)
≤ max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1−
(
(hi − (hi − h¯i)( yixi+yi ))(xi + yi)
(hi − (hi − h¯i)( wivi+wi ))(vi + wi)
)σ)
= max
i∈[n],zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− ( hixi + h¯iyi
hivi + h¯iwi
)σ)
≤ max
zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
(1− ( kxi + yi
kvi + wi
)σ) , (25)
:= f(xi, yi, vi, wi) .
In (25) we use the Definition 2 of the maximum degree of
asymmetry. For ease of notation, we drop the subscripts for
f(x, y, v, w).
We now investigate this expression more closely, and show
that the maximum of this expression with respect to x and y
occurs at either x = 0 or y = 0. We do this by showing there
are no critical points with x > 0 and y > 0, and that outside
of a finite region, the function is decreasing with respect to
both x and y.
First we show that there exist no critical points, meaning
points for which dfdx =
df
dy = 0, for k > 1. We have
df
dx
=
kx+ y − ( kx+ykv+w )σ(kx+ y + kσ(x+ y))
(v + w)(kx+ y)
df
dy
=
kx+ y − ( kx+ykv+w )σ(kx+ y + σ(x+ y))
(v + w)(kx+ y)
.
Since k > 1, we conclude that dfdx 6= dfdy for x > 0 and y > 0.
To show the second component, we see that
df
dx
≤ 1
v + w
(1− ( kx+ y
kv + w
)σ) and
df
dy
≤ 1
v + w
(1− ( kx+ y
kv + w
)σ) .
Therefore, for the region y > kv + w − kx, the function is
decreasing with x and y.
These two facts together imply the maximum of f in the
first quadrant lies on either the x or y axis. Checking these
two candidate functions,
f(x, 0, v, w) =
x(1− ( kxkv+w )σ)
v + w
f(0, y, v, w) =
y(1− ( ykv+w )σ)
v + w
These functions are concave with respect to x and y, with
minima at x∗ = ( 1σ+1 )
1/σ kv+w
k and y
∗ = ( 1σ+1 )
1/σ(kv + w)
respectively. When plugging these in, we find that the solution
along the y-axis is greater, so
max
x,y≥0
f(x, y, v, w) = σ(
1
σ + 1
)1+1/σ
kv + w
v + w
.
We then find that when restricted to capacity model 1,
β(Ck,σ) ≤ max
v,w≤0
σ(
1
σ + 1
)1+1/σ
kv + w
v + w
≤ kσ( 1
σ + 1
)1+1/σ
= kξ(σ) .
For capacity model 2:
β(c, q)
≤ max
zi∈R2≥0
xi + yi
vi + wi
− ( kx
2
i + 2kxiyi + y
2
i
kv2i + 2kviwi + w
2
i
)σ(
vi + wi
xi + yi
)σ−1
:= g(xi, yi, vi, wi)
We again find that k > 1 =⇒ dgdx 6= dgdy . Further,
df
dx
≤ 1
v + w
(1− ((v + w
x+ y
)
kx2 + 2kxy + y2
kv2 + 2kvw + w2
)σ and
df
dy
≤ 1
v + w
(1− ((v + w
x+ y
)
kx2 + 2kxy + y2
kv2 + 2kvw + w2
)σ ,
so
kx2 + 2kxy + y2
x+ y
<
kv2 + 2kvw + w2
v + w
=⇒ df
dx
< 0 and
df
dy
< 0 .
Using the same reasoning as above, we now just search the x-
and y-axes. As above, g(x, 0, v, w) is concave with respect to x
and g(0, y, v, w) is concave with respect to y, with maxima at
x = ( 1σ+1 )
1/σ kv2+2kvw+w2
k(v+w) and y = (
1
σ+1 )
1/σ kv2+2kvw+w2
v+w ,
respectively. Comparing these, we find the maximum is the
latter, so
max
x,y≥0
g(x, y, v, w) = σ(
1
σ + 1
)1+1/σ
kv2 + 2kvw + w2
(v + w)2
.
Then, for capacity model 2,
β(Ck,σ) ≤ max
v,w≤0
σ(
1
σ + 1
)1+1/σ
kv2 + 2kvw + w2
(v + w)2
≤ σ( 1
σ + 1
)1+1/σk
= kξ(σ) .
Together, this shows that regardless of capacity model,
β(Ck,σ) ≤ kξ(σ). The application of Lemma 1 completes the
proof.
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